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Forum Juridicum
The Influence of Environment on the Litigation Process
Leon Green*
Let us assume that the function of the litigation process is
to settle important matters that cannot be settled by agreement
of the parties outside the courthouse.
We know that this process requires considerable manpowerclerks, police officials, lawyers, witnesses, jurors, and judges.
We also know that it requires a system of procedurespleadings, service of process, motions, taking of testimony, instructions, arguments, findings, orders, judgment, and finally
execution, with many ancillary processes throughout.
Of equal importance we know that any litigation may involve
much of what we call substantive law - constitutions, codes,
statutes, interpretations, theories, principles, doctrines, rules,
and formulas.
We further know that for the litigation process to be successful the inner workings of this massive organization of manpower, procedures, and law must be subject to the control of
lawyers and judges who shape the litigation in the particular
case.
All of this is the common knowledge of the legal practitioner.
To the law student the process looks forbidding, but after a few
years of practice he will not be able to remember when he didn't
know all about it.
These are not the things that consume a lawyer's nights,
Sundays, and holidays, that give him ulcers, and eventually make
his hair turn gray. These indicia of maturity have another
source -

the processing of the particular case -

how to give

form and substance to the case in hand so that his client may
have a favorable judgment- and perhaps also, the lawyer a
good fee.
*Professor of Law, University of Texas. This paper was delivered by Professor
Green to the student body of the Louisiana State University Law School on

November 19, 1959.
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At this stage in the process the lawyer is like any other
artist. He may have all the raw materials anyone could use but
it is his responsibility to create out of them a cause of action
that will command the favor of those who have the power of
judgment.
Local Environment
Let us consider some of the immediate things that the lawyer
must consider. It might be said in a word that his overall concern is the environment of his case, or the environment he can
create for it. Environment is a complex concept and must itself
be critically examined.
Let us assume that the lawyer has investigated the factual
data available by document, scientific, and lay testimony and is
satisfied he has a basis for his claim or defense. But having
them and using them are two different things. How shall he
present them to his best advantage? Documents and witnesses
do not fall into a fighting front of themselves. Strategy and
tactics here are as important as on the battlefield. Even if he
has an "A" bomb (which is seldom the case) the problem when
and where and how he shall drop it is not without difficulty.
What is the local environment: the lay of the land; the moral,
business and social terrain; the pill-boxes and fortifications of
the opposition? Who is the opposing client, his lawyer, and witnesses? How are they regarded in the community? Who is his
own client and how does he stand in the community? Who are
the jurors and who is the judge, and what are their attitudes
with respect to the matters involved?
No lawyer who knows his business will trust to luck at this
point. He will carefully weigh all such matters; take advantage
of those that are favorable, and hedge against those that are
unfavorable. As good soldiers can be routed, and their arms and
equipment go for nought by the bungling of a bad general, so
the effects of good witnesses and even documents can be destroyed by the bungling of an incompetent lawyer or by the
superior skill of a more competent one on the other side. Strategy
and tactics in time come to be a lawyer's second nature. He
reacts to the cards he holds, assesses their strength and fends
against their weakness as any other professional does in an
adversary conflict. Local environment may present the most

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XX

troublesome phase of a litigation and not infrequently turn the
tide of the litigation process. If you are in doubt try suing a
bank, or well-known doctor, or the general store in a rural
parish; more vividly perhaps would be the prosecution of a
racial "civil rights" case before a local jury.
The General Environment
However great the pull of the local environment and whatever the judgment in a trial court, if the case is an important
one it will probably be reviewed by an appellate court and the
judgment may be upset by the pull of the larger environment.
This pull is frequently described as public policy, public welfare,
social justice, or simply as law. I prefer to call it the interests
of "we the people." The further a case is removed from the local
environment the less its influence and the greater the influence
of the general environment. This larger environment is made up
of many factors.
In the first place the personnel and the procedures of the
appellate court are different. Here we have the high priests of
the judicial process pondering a record and briefs. The parties,
witnesses, jurors and trial judges tend to disappear or become
mere names. The search ostensibly is for errors, and the issues
revolve more largely around law then around fact. The lawyers
and judges are in complete command and control. Argument
rather than testimony predominates. The issues are cast in a
new and sometimes larger mold. Their resolution may depend
upon how other issues somewhat similar have been resolved in
cases which have already been decided. If the issues are new
their resolution must be consistent with the basic notions of
justice and not create too many and too difficult problems in
cases yet to come. The area of judgment broadens greatly. The
dispute of the parties must be settled but in its settlement larger
interests than those of the parties may control. It is thus that
the interests of "we the people" as the third party to every
litigation play such a large part in the shaping and growth of
the law.
Let us consider in some detail our more important interests
in the case in litigation. It is important to us that the law be
consistent -that it rest upon something more stable than the
individual judgments of one or more judges. As a profession
we desire that it be somewhat predictable in its operations on
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our clients; if not certainty, at least that it have stability. This
is one of the purposes the doctrines of precedent and principle
are supposed to have; why previous decisions are appealed to
and why at common law it is sought to make them binding on
a court. That both precedent and principle have great influence
in directing judgment cannot be doubted.
Equally important is the attitude of judges themselves. They
want to feel that they are administering law to the ends of justice-something they can rely upon, point to, and not be charged
with subjecting the rights of litigants to their own notions of
justice. They do not like to be charged with making new law
or engaging in what is sometimes called "judicial" legislation.
It is highly important to judges that they keep their decisions
consistent with one another and with underlying principle. To
do so saves time, labor and worry, and personal responsibility
when they can say to the lawyers in a case "the law is settled."
It is a position hard to meet however erroneous a lawyer thinks
a decision may be. He cannot openly, at least, accuse the judges
of being a "bunch of dodos," though the temptation at times
isvery great.
Also precedent and principle serve as "tranquilizers" for
judges and lawyers, as well as laymen. We often hear it said
"this is a government of laws and not of men," and the cliche
makes us feel good. It also makes it easy, when some case comes
up from the trial court that cannot be squared with the cases
which have gone before, to send the newcomer back for re-trial
with the observation that if change in the law is to be made it
must be made by the legislature. This is called "passing the
judicial buck," and this can be very irritating when the matter
happens to lie primarily in the court's domain.
In this appeal to principle and precedent argument frequently
waxes hot and cannot be easily put down. Even assuming that
opposing counsel and the court are rather strictly confined by
the record, this does not preclude them from reading and evaluating the record differently. Emphasis at one point, tip-toeing
at another, stroking conflicting data and the trial court's errors
with light and heavy tints here and there, may make totally
different pictures. Nor does it matter that one lawyer or one
judge is a better painter than the one who paints a different
picture. They need not be the most highly rated of the profession. They may be daubers, but it is their's to daub and to
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insist on the genuineness of their creation. What determines
which image shall seize the majority of the judges and hold them
to judgment for one party or the other? No one can tell. But
this much is true: the lawyer for each party sees in the record
the facts that support and justify his client's cause. Likewise,
while the judge has no client, he is never without a cause. His
cause may be the consistency of the law, some principle, some
interpretation, some decision in another case, his own evaluation
of the facts, or conviction that new law is required to meet the
demands of justice. Whatever his cause, he too is likely to see in
the record the image that supports his cause. But once an image
of the record is set, the judge who holds it becomes an advocate
for his position much as does the lawyer, the only difference
being that the lawyer's cause is that of his client while the
judge's cause is some interest of "we the people."
If the record permits different images, consider how much
greater the possibilities are for the many variations in choice
of applicable law! The lawyers will normally have committed
themselves to a choice of law that supports their client's cause.
They may differ in choice of theory, principle, interpretation
of code or statute, former decision, appropriate rule or formula.
The court is not required to choose between them -which
is
right or wrong. No court will accept the law as contended for
by a lawyer unless it accords with its own judgment. The court
takes the law as its own province, and while the parties' dispute
is important it must be decided consistently with the interests
of "we the people." Our interests demand consistency and stability of law as already discussed, but they also demand justice
between the parties, if not at too high a cost to consistency and
stability. Even more importantly our interests may demand a
shift in the law - modification, broadening, even rejection of
what has been and a new declaration of principle. Lawyers
hesitate to go so far as to ask a court to disturb its scheme of
adjudication. They prefer to stretch some well-accepted principle or doctrine or code provision to cover the case, and they
try to clear the way -run
interference for the court's acceptance by distinguishing former decisions or interpretations that
lie athwart its path. But there are cases in which this cannot
be done without the lawyer's contentions appearing ridiculous
in the eyes of the court. Then comes the time when the lawyer
must make bold to ask the modification or rejection of some old
principle and the recognition of a new principle even though it
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may require a confession of error on the part of the court in
former cases.
Nothing else so serious and so likely to be received with ill
grace can be asked of a court. There is no foretelling how far
the introduction of some new principle or the setting of some
new course will extend and what labors and difficulties will be
created for the courts throughout the judicial system. But not
infrequently courts do make departures from a former course:
sometimes unknowingly, sometimes ever so slightly, frequently
with premeditated silence, and now and then boldly. Whence the
impulse that gives direction to their departures from some wellcharted course? Why do courts ever extend the law's protection? The answers do not lie far afield and they are usually
found on the broad horizons of the general environment.
It may be difficult to realize but any important change in
the social environment or any significant scientific invention or
discovery makes it necessary to discard or modify old law and
frequently create new law. The last century has witnessed
hundreds of such instances. War, economic depression, communism, the motor vehicle and paved highways, industrial
mass production, the modern newspaper, radio, television,
photography, advertising, oil and gas industry, installment
credit, chain stores, processing and marketing of foods and
chemicals, the various public utilities, and the airplane, are a
few of the numerous examples that could be given. While much
change in law is brought about through legislation, perhaps
most of it is developed in litigation between private individuals.
No one can read the cases of the last twenty years involving the
liability of doctors and charitable hospitals for injuries inflicted
on their patients without realizing how the development of
medical science and wonder drugs, the complexity of treatment,
the increase in financial stability of charities, and the availability of liability insurance, have revolutionized the law in this
area. The same can be said of numerous other areas.
We note without too much excitement how rapidly the things
we use and the way we do things become obsolete and are replaced by the new. In the course of ten years nearly every machine, tool, structure or process of any kind that we know undergoes modification and improvement. But we are incredulous
when we are told that our legal principles, theories, doctrines,
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and rules suffer a similar obsolescence and modification, renewal, and replacement. If you are doubtful, examine the Century, Decennial and the current West digests, or the casebooks,
texts, or treatises or thirty or forty years ago in any field. You
will be struck by what was important then and what is important now: the issues lawyers and courts spent their time
about; how they talked about their cases; their procedures; and
their remedies. Some of the more important current subjects
will not be found at all. You will find many of the same terms
still used; but if you will examine them closely, you will be
surprised by the changes in meaning given them. I do not know
of a single important legal concept that has not suffered expansion or inflation on the one hand or contraction or atrophy
on the other. There may not be much difference between the
ox-wagon, the tin lizzie and the 1958 Cadillac. Each provided
transportation for its day. But there are enough differences so
that if you were preparing to be a mechanic, or a manufacturer
of 1960 vehicles you would not spend much time on the ox-wagon
and the tin lizzie. You would choose to store them away as
museum pieces so that your children may see how crudely their
forebears got about and what progress has since been made.
We have thousands of museum pieces in our law libraries
and all too often we see lawyers and courts parading them as
though they had all the vitality of law suited to modern life.
They somehow ignore the fact that obsolescence in law is as
great as in other areas of our society. They are shocked out of
their boots by the suggestions that principles and doctrines grow
and die and take new forms as other creations of this world.
They may put heavy store by the words of Mr. Jefferson or
Justice Holmes for example, but seldom refer to Jefferson's
suggestion that all statutes should expire automatically if not
re-enacted within a given period, or that of Justice Holmes that
it would be a good thing if all law books more than twenty years
old were burned. Their thought, of course, was that periodically
we should have to rethink our laws and get rid of the vested
interests that enshackle the law and its language.
I need not press the point. We have chosen a slower and
more tedious process to reach the same ends. We fill our old
terms with new meaning and continue to use them. If we but
let our intelligence have its head we know that life oozes out
of most of what is written very soon and perhaps out of all that

1960]

FORUM JURIDICUM

is written in a shorter time than we are willing to believe.
Immortal writings are about as scarce as immortal men- and
the truth is that each is immortal only because we, the living,
from time to time give them immortality- stuff them full of
new life by the process of spiritual or intellectual transfusion.
We have a way of convincing ourselves that they still live and
breathe when it is our life that we breathe into them. Please
do not misunderstand me. I do not discount or discredit this
marvelous process of transfusion. Even though it is the reverse
of what we profess to believe and teach, I value it all the more
because it teaches that life is immortal- if man and what he
writes are not - and life thereby attains greater heights and is
capable of successfully meeting and measuring up to much
greater demands of an ever-developing society.
No doubt most lawyers realize that language is necessarily
subjective- subjective to the user and to the receiver. This is
true of words and phrases, and even truer of sentences and paragraphs. They seldom carry identical thought to different persons - and once the environment is changed they never carry
that of the writer. Poetry is our best example. We love poetry
as we do music because we can fill it full, each to his own capacity. The score can be rendered differently by numberless
performers. Stradavarius could never use his wonderful fiddle
as Fritz Kreisler or Heifetz. But what is true of music and
poetry is equally true of great prose- Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address, the Apology of Socrates, Emerson's Self Reliance and
Compensation, The Declaration of Independence, The Lord's
Prayer, or any other you may choose. The reason is that language takes on the coloring of a specific environment which can
never be created again. We may use the same language in another environment, and do so very effectively, but when we do
we give the language a new meaning relevant to the new environment. We give it new life - our life-a
rapturous experience perhaps- and this may be done over and over again
until it becomes so tattered and torn that its meaning becomes
diffused or even lost in solemn mockery. Who is so credulous
as to believe that a modern rendition of one of Shakespeare's
plays on stage or screen conveys the meaning of its creator?
What meaning does it convey on the high school stage? But
who would deny that its rendition by great artists is not even
more gripping than that Shakespeare himself could have con-
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ceived? And who would question the values added by the
artists ?
I doubt that any one can read and use to the best advantage
the opinion in any significant case without bringing more to
it than the judge who wrote it, for the chances are that he has
said more than he has done or has done more than he has said.
Neither is it likely that what he has said or done corresponds
exactly with what he thought at the time, or what we think
when we read his opinion. And it is very unlikely that any two
or more of us will agree completely on what he said or did.
Language is just that subjective and unstable. But that does
not mean that we cannot use the opinion to advantage, for we
give it our own meaning and press it on our courts, our fellow
lawyers, our fellow judges, and innocent students as the true exposition. Thus the law is being re-written and re-expounded from
day to day. And thus it is also that no one can become a good
lawyer until the law's language becomes as much a part of him
as is his blood, for as one feeds his body the other feeds his intellect or spirit.
These observations find support in all the law books where
judges and writers generally employ the words of other judges
and writers as attesting to the wisdom or folly, as the case may
be, of those who make use of them. If the words of an able
jurist are brought to bear witness for a strong position it makes
the position stronger in all our minds even though they were
spoken in a different context. But if the same words are attributed to an unknown, they may add nothing. Thus it is not
the words that give strength, but the image we have created of
the jurist who spoke them. Quite frequently it is not the authoritative value of thought we seek but the weight of personalities which were developed in one environment and which
we now transplant by the use of their words to bear witness in
another and different environment. This is one of the finest
powers of the lawyer and adds tremendously to his creative
art. We daily make use of the great courts, judges, and writers
of the past to support our position in the litigation process
and frequently do so, no doubt, far beyond anything they would
stand for if they were permitted to enter a protest. What we do
is to call upon their names and fill their words with our own
meanings for our own purposes, and gain shelter and protection
for our client's cause that we could not otherwise obtain. We
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make oracles or saints, as it were, of the great names of our
profession and call upon them to speak our wisdom for the nurture and growth of new law.
This process is not unlike nature's process that we find in
plant life. How often have you observed how new plant life
springs from the wet rot of the plant life of former seasons,
even if it must be plowed up, re-spread or produced synthetically,
and how the new plant life thrives from the soil so provided. Is
this the old life reborn or new life utilizing the old to serve its
growth and living purpose? Whatever answer you may give,
this much is certain, no stalk is so quickly displaced as by its
own seeds, and no seeds germinate so quickly and grow so
vigorously as those that fall in the rich environment made by
the decay of life that has gone before. The old displaces the new
so gradually, so imperceptibly, so naturally, yet so inexorably
that though it take place before our eyes, we scarcely notice
the transmutation and never get excited about what takes place.
But we should get greatly excited if it did not take place.
The regenerative process in law is not less than that taking
place on every hand. This leads me to say that the chief growth
of law is not found alone in the change of social, physical, or
scientific environment, as great as that may be, but is found
primarily in the growth of new lawyers and the fresh ideas
they develop as they face the ever re-creating environment. Law
is always in the making, and it cannot be otherwise, for its
creators have come endlessly throughout the life of society and
must continue to come as long as there is a society. And that is
why law schools are of such great importance. They are the
nurseries of the law. We no longer risk the ways of the forest.
We nurture lawyers by design.
The evolution which has taken place in law schools during
the last half century is hardly conceivable. They have come as it
were out of the stillness of the night with little ferment in the
social order. If you are in doubt, take any law school you will
and study its development during the last fifty years in physical
facilities, libraries, administration, faculty, students, curriculum,
and methods of instruction. And the man doesn't live who can
foretell what the next fifty years will bring. The great Harvard
Law School forty years ago was thought to have reached a level
never to be surpassed, but now, even some of those who have
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come along since that time have been pushed out by a group
of youngsters to whom they and their teachings are all but
strangers. It may well be that the social scene moves so rapidly
that people become too ignorant to be of much value long before
their life span has run its course. One California law school
refuses to accept this idea and has found that it pays to utilize
the talents of law teachers thrown in the discard by schools in
which they have spent their lives. Other schools are gingerly
experimenting with this practice. It need not be added that
wherever tried the turnover in personnel is rapid, and that no
doubt has it advantages.
This idea of personnel obsolescence is not foreign to the legal
profession. Some practitioners reach the end of their business
because they have outlived their clients, or new managements
of their corporate clients have sought younger and more contemporary lawyers to do the company's business. Other practitioners not so very old in years have found their practice
dying because new institutions and new problems calling for
new law have superseded the institutions they have represented
and the law they have practiced. Some practitioners are inclined
to point a finger of blame at law schools for departing from the
"fundamentals" and for substituting what is sometimes derisively called "new fangled" subjects. But if they were back in
school they would soon realize that the "fundamentals" have
taken on new forms and designs and the "new fangled" subjects
are already fundamentals without which no young lawyer would
enter practice.
The regenerative process in law as it is reflected in litigation, as well as in law office and school, is relentless as you yourselves will too soon realize. The manna you gather today will
have worms in it tomorrow, and you will be forced to gather
new manna day by day to sustain your professional competence
as long as you practice your profession. And there is no bayoulocked parish which offers you a safe retreat. Many lawyers,
and some quite successfully, have fended against a ruthless fate
by establishing firms into which from time to time they feed
young lawyers. The ages of the members of the firms are a sort
of stairstep arrangement. Young life is nicely balanced with
the old and the affection of the young for the old may preserve
the elders for a life time of usefulness and happiness. It is not a
bad arrangement but is one that calls for hearts of loyalty and
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gratitude - qualities of character too often smothered by ambition and aggressiveness.
Do I have to say more than that with a continuing procession
of new students, new teachers, new lawyers, new judges, better
trained and equipped than their predecessors for the new environment and new problem - the litigation process their laboratory - the regenerative process in law cannot be stopped.
And may I ask, with all its implications of courage and opportunities to expand your own lives to their uttermost, would you
have it otherwise?

A Brief (?) Opinion on Brief Opinions
George W. Hardy, Jr.*
As this article is written I have before me an opinion of the
highest court of another state, which occupies almost eighteen
pages of the Reporter volume in which it is printed and bound.
By the side of this exhaustive pronouncement there lies a single
sheet of legal size paper upon which is mimeographed a suggested redraft of the printed opinion, which would occupy much
less than one printed page. Careful examination discloses that
all the substantial pronouncements of both fact and law neces.sary to a resolution of the case have been adequately set forth in
the redraft.
This illustration serves as substantial justification of the increasingly frequent criticism of the unnecessary length and complexity of judicial opinions. It is quite understandable that members of the Bar are often irritated by the loss of both time and
patience in the necessity of wading through innumerable details
of irrelevant and immaterial matter which encumber many of
our judicial pronouncements. In view of this conclusion; it appears to be high time for appellate judges to engage in a critical
examination of the style, manner, and form of writing opinions,
with the hope that they may be enabled to reduce the length
thereof without sacrificing either necessary or desirable reasons
and conclusions.
In the course of this examination it will be helpful to establish
*Judge, Second Circuit, Louisiana Court of Appeal.

